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The idea for this paper was suggested, unwittingly to be sure, by the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in his famous speech of September 27, 1965 inaugurating the Soviet Economic Reforms. Of the several changes in directives given to enterprises which he announced, two are relevant here: (1) The greater emphasis to be placed on profits, and (2) the replacement of the output target by sales.
Taking advantage of the theorist's inherent right of simplification, I would say that the enterprise manager (or director, as he is usually called) was instructed to maximize an unspecified function of profits and sales, subject to certain planning directives and several constraints 2) which, though important in themselves, need not be considered here. ' I will argue in Part II that the maximization of a weighted sum of profits and sales makes excellent sense when the enterprise is allowed to set the prices of its outputs. supply. ' When such prices are combined with excess demand, still common in the Soviet economy, the maximization of profits by enterprises can lead to all sorts of weird results.
The defects of the Soviet price system, like those of practically any system of controlled prices, are too well known to require a long discussion here. Let me merely mention two: (1) Unless all dimensions of a commodity or of a service are specified explicitly --a costly and a laborious process --its numerous characteristics cannot be controlled by the single dimension of a price; its quality will deteriorate.
The infrequency of Soviet price revisions discourages the introduction of new products and of new models. A price set for a new commodity normally covers the average cost of production (when large-scale output begins), plus a modest markup. With time, the cost of production declines due to the learning process and similar reasons --there is little wage inflation in the Soviet Union. The old product becomes highly profitable.
The manager has no incentive to replace it with a new one, subject to 5) that modest profit margin.
'
More frequent price revisions are of course costly.
In spite of the present trend toward re-centralization, a day will surely come when Soviet planners will have to delegate at least some price-setting rights to the producers. Hungary has already made some progress in this direction. As a result, the ratios^will correspond not to the actual demand elasticities for specific commodities but to their weighted average.
Hence, products whose elasticities are higher than the average for the department,will be over-produced, and the others -produced below the optimum. It 1s highly unlikely, however, that demand elasticities can be estimated with much precision even under the best of circumstances.
So all we can expect from our bonus scheme 1s a movement to some 10 9) approximation of the optimal output. ' Expressions (6) and (8) give only the relative magnitudes of u and v : they do not of course determine the absolute size of the bonus which the Planner will presumably set according to some other cons Iderati 6ns.
The whole scheme will make no sense if |E| <_ 1. Direct price regulation (perhaps similar to that practiced in our public utilities) would be required. Actually, many demand elasticities need not be particularly low because they pertain not to the demand for the whole industry but only to that for the individual enterprise.
To obtain some idea about the composition of the bonus, let us take a demand elasticity as high as -4. Set v = 1 per cent, and u = 3
per cent (as given by expression (6)) and assume sales of 1000 and a net profit of 100 (a 10 per cent profit margin seems reasonable). Then the bonus will equal 3% x 100 + 1% x 1000 = 3 + 10 « 13. Note that more than three-quarters of this bonus (77 per cent) are derived from sales.
Even with E_= -6, two-thirds of the bonus still come from that source. The maximizing equation (2) can be rewritten as (12) zR' = C. To Part II . Second-order conditions for profit maximization under ordinary monopoly are R" < C". The differentiation of equation (2) in the text expresses these conditions as zR_" < C\ Hence, if R" < stability is reinforced. But if R" > (which may happen with increasing |E_|), a previously stable situation may become unstable.
In the general case, It is desired that prices should be proportional to the respective rates of transformation in production:
r-= Tfor all land j..
P J*
Substituting (19) into (18) yields (20) (u+v.)(l +~) = (u+v 4 )(l + J-) for all 1 and j.
The solution given by expression (8) in the text is (21) £ (E, + 1).
It can be easily ascertained that (21) satisfies equation (20), because (21) implies for all i_ and j_ (22) (u+vJO + jl-) = u = (u+ Vi )(l + i-)
22
The condition (21) is not the only solution which satisfies (20) .
The latter expression says that the manager will produce (or buy) the proper amounts (and charge or pay the proper prices) provided the (u_ + v.) are inversely proportional to the respective (1 +i-).
As was already mentioned in the text regarding expression (12) there demand elasticity equals -1 and the marginal revenue 1s zero. On   Fig. 3 , the rising demand elasticity provides no maximum point for sales.
8.
The second-order conditions are given in the Mathematical Note.
9.
In case of a discriminating monopoly the u/v ratios will have to be differentiated among the several markets. This point was made
by Lars Jonung of the University of Lund.
10. In general, the instructions given to managers of branches or departments of capitalist firms, the evaluation of these managers' performance, the nature of their compensation, the delegation of powers to them, and similar subjects should be of great Interest to researchers on socialist countries.
